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What do you mean by...? Dialogue, conversation, interpretation

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Abstract

This article presents a review about the notion of dialogue or conversation from some hermeneutic philosophy concepts, according to the thought of german philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. The hermeneutics deals with the issue of human comprehension as a essentially interpretative phenomena, by the continuous reviewing and projection of meaning under the circular form of a dialogical process, described as a structure of questioning. By the openness to the dialogue it is possible the revealing of conceptual structures by the recognition of the other's opinion as something meaningful, through which we can reach participation on agreements upon those meanings. This approach implies an post-rationalistic ontology and epistemology, in which subject-object dichotomy traditional of cartesian thinking are surpassed by the comprehension of the interdependence relationship of interpretative meanings.

Keywords: Dialogue, Conversation, Hermeneutics, Interpretation, Understanding.

1. Introduction

This article aims to contribute for a enriched reflexion about the notion of dialogue, understood as a fundamental instance on planning, developing, implementation and evaluation of sociocultural action which, according to this *V!rus Journal* call of papers¹, should have the purpose of stimulate transformations and the emergence of critical and reflexive stances in their participants. Based on a bibliographic review from research activities conducted on Research Centre of Interactive Living Studies - Nomads.USP² - about interactivity and design processes, specially related to the MA research 'Horizon of Conversation: conceptions of the architectural design process', at the Postgraduate Program at the Architecture and Urbanism Institute at the University of Sao Paulo -IAU.USP³, Sao Carlos campus. On that matter, the article also represents a development of some topics discussed in a previous article about the conceptions of design in architecture in the today's digital culture context⁴. It should be observed that on the background of this reflection lies the author's personal impression given by his practical experiencing on the actions of the *Hybrid Territories* project⁵, conducted by Nomads.usp, specially with regard to the 'Intercultural Dialogues'⁶ action which belongs to the 'sound' axis, elaborated between August and December 2011.

It is well assured that dialogue or talk are an essential instance for sociocultural action effectiveness, which invariably depends on the coordination of intentions, expectations and understanding between its participants. However, beyond its communicational and organizational role, dialogue allows the recognition of similarities and diversities, allowing both the sharing of common understandings necessary for every collective enterprise, and the perception of differences of opinion that must be discussed in favor of common interest. In both cases, dialogic interaction is capable of changing its interlocutors by the revision of its comprehensions face the encounter with the other. In this respect, it should be introduced the assertion of the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (2000 [1900]) about the conception of dialogue⁷:

What is dialogue? For sure we think about it as a process between people, which for all its breadth and potential infinity have a unit within itself and a closed ambit. A dialogue is, for us, what left a mark. What makes a true dialogue is not having the same experience of something, but in founding on the other something that we had not found in our own experience of the world. What moved the philosophers to criticize the monological thought is the same that the individual experiences itself. The dialog has a transforming power. Where a dialogue was successful something that changed us was left. The dialogue has thus a close proximity to the friendship. It is only in dialogue (and the 'laugh

¹ Available at: <<http://www.nomads.usp.br/virus/virus07>>.

² Available at: <<http://www.nomads.usp.br>>

³ Available at: <<http://www.iau.usp.br/>>.

⁴ Available at: <<http://www.nomads.usp.br/virus/virus06/?sec=6&item=1&lang=en>>.

⁵ Available at: <<http://www.nomads.usp.br/territorios.hibridos/>>.

⁶ Available at: <http://www.nomads.usp.br/territorios.hibridos/acoas/som/dialogos_interculturais>.

⁷ As referenced in the 1972 original text "Die Unfähigkeit zum Gespräch" in: GADAMER, H., *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.2, Wahrheit und Methode. Ergänzungen, Register. The version cited in this article was our translation from the portuguese printing, as referenced.

together', which functions as a overflowed tacit understanding) that friends can meet each other and build that kind of fellowship where everyone remains the same for the other because both find themselves by the other (Gadamer, 2002 [1972], p.247, author's own translation).

On the other hand, it is also common place that the absence of dialogue is related to every sort of conflict, disagreement and misunderstanding, since actions collectively experienced leads to distinct interpretations, that set the understandings by which decision-making and projecting actions are conducted, causing consequences also interpreted by the time as beneficial or not. This process become more complex by the natural emergence of ambiguity, because considering the difference between sociopolitical values and interests, the satisfaction of a particular group of individuals can be annoying to another group, and vice versa, since is not possible within social and political relationships, *a priori*, distinguish which group is correct and should have its purposes served (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Despite the shortage of absolute consensus or certainty, it is possible, on the other hand, value interpretations as adequate or inadequate within some particular context or referential, leading to agreements capable of overcoming the inevitable state of disruption implied by discord. This view evidences the importance of the construction of a conceptual repertory to help meta-understandings or second order understandings about the interpretative processes. According to this we present a brief review to hermeneutic philosophy⁸, highlighting some concepts from its theoretical thinking, through the reading of authors covered in our research activities⁹.

2. Philosophical hermeneutics revisited

According to Snodgrass and Coyne (2006, p.8) the question of interpretation received systematic treatment in the work of German theologian and philologist Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), that in the formulation of his 'General Hermeneutics' in 1810, characterized the goal of hermeneutic to unravel the processes of understanding literary texts. In this version of hermeneutics, Schleiermacher postulated in favor of the analogy that the interpretation would be a reconstruction, in the sense that only one would be able to understand certain literary works that were reconstructed from all its relations according to their original context, which involves determining a orientation or position, so that "[...] To

⁸ According to a brief panorama by Robert Sokolowski, American PhD and researcher: "Hermeneutic began like a specifically German movement with Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and specially Willhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) who was contemporary of Edmund Husserl. Hermeneutic originally highlighted the structures of reading and interpreting texts from the past and presented its work like a philosophy of biblical and literary interpretation and of historic researcher. Heidegger expended the hermeneutics comprehension of texts and documents study to some auto-interpretation of the human existence as such. The person primarily associated to hermeneutic is, naturally, Has-Georg Gadamer, who was not only a Heidegger's studios, but also another interpreter of Plato, Aristoteles and poetic texts. [...] Gadamer was influenced by Heidegger, under whose guidance he studied in Marburg, but less influenced by Husserl, with whom also studied in Freiburg" (Sokolowski, 2010 [2000], pp.235-236, our translation).

⁹ As shown above about the author's Master Degree level academic investigation in architecture and urbanism. In this context, this introduction is based on the reference of researches called Adrian Snodgrass and Richar Coyne (2006) about Hermeneutic in their work '*Interpretation in architecture: Design as a way of thinking*', 2006; and on the vision of conceptions of Heideggerian Phenomenology from researches called Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores in their work '*Understanding Computers and Cognition: a New Foundation for Design*', 1990.

interpret something is to position it within a set of relationships.” (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006, p.8). In particular, the consideration about circularity in the relationship between the parties and the whole of something to be understood by interpretation was central to the hermeneutic of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), who succeeded Schleiermacher in the development of hermeneutic thinking and provided a theoretical basis on which the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) developed his own theories of interpretation (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006, p.13). For hermeneutical philosophy as expressed in the thought of Gadamer, understanding is a dynamic process by the formulation of the 'hermeneutic circle' of interpretation, whose originally axiom would refer to the old Greek rhetoric¹⁰:

The hermeneutic rule according to which we must understand the whole from the singular and singular from the whole comes from ancient rhetoric and was transferred by modern hermeneutics, from the art of speaking to the art of understanding. In both cases we are dealing with a prior circular relationship. The anticipation of meaning, which includes the whole, gained an explicit understanding through the fact that the parties, determined by the whole, in turn determine this same whole. (Gadamer, 2002 [1972], p.72, author's own translation).

According to this statement, Snodgrass and Coyne (2006 [1997], p.36) noted the suggestion of a possible logical paradox about the phenomenon of hermeneutic circularity, by the point that since it is need a general understanding to the understanding of the parties and in turn, the general understanding depends on the understanding of the same parties, in practice, the process itself could not be started. The answer to this question, the authors say, depends on two essential understandings about the functioning of the hermeneutic circle: 1., That interpretive processes are located in our life experience and can not be disregarded of a contextualized existential sense from which , 2.; we project senses in our expectations of things, i.e., “[...] Interpretation brings with it an anticipation, albeit vague and informal, of the meaning of the whole; and the light of this anticipation plays back to illuminate the parts.” (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006 [1997], p.37). In other words, to truly understand the hermeneutic formulation we must grasp a sense of 'projection' essential to this process, i.e. it is projected the meaning of the whole and this preliminary projection is continually reviewed¹¹: [...]

¹⁰ Gadamer tracks the origins of the parts and the whole rule to the classic rethoric, but underline the proper distinction of hermeneutics: 'All the history of thought confirms this antique proximity between rethoric and hermeneutics. However, hermeneutics always have a element that surpasses rethoric: it includes a encounter with the other's opinions, that came by time to the speech. [...] Therefore, hermeneutics is philosophy because it's not restricted to an theory of art, that only comprehend some more else opinion. Hermeneutics implies, before, that all understanding of something became preceded by self-criticism. The one who understanding do not postulate a superior position. Confesses, before, the need to put in prove the truth that supposes it's own. (GADAMER, 1976/2002, p.140-141, author's own translation)

¹¹ As described by Gadamer about textual interpretation: "[...] who want to understand a text should always carry out a project. He projects a sense in advance of the whole, as soon as they show a first direction in the text. This first sense only was enabled in reading the text because we always have certain expectations from the perspective of a

The projection, at first unclear and only existing in outline, plays back into the interpretation of the parts, requiring their revision even as the projected meaning itself is continually revised in the light of the interpretation and increasing understanding of the parts. (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006[1997], p.37).

As a result of this rearrangement process, an reflective understanding of the whole rises gradually. Essential to modern hermeneutics, this 'projecting' concept refers to the Heideggerian ontological thought: "[...] Not only do we throw forward our pre-understandings in every act of interpretation, says Heidegger, but the pre-understandings themselves have been 'thrown' into our present situation from past experience." (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006[1997], p.39). Based on this understanding, the authors say it is not possible to conceive human existence as something 'objective', as we are "[...] thrown into the midst of a network of understandings of practices, institutions, conventions, aims, tools, expectations and a multitude of other factors that make us what we are." (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006[1997], p.39) At this point, it is worth mentioning Heidegger himself, who stressed the need for attention on the pre-understandings that are naturally linked to the process of interpretation by the hermeneutic circle:

The circle should not be downgraded to a *vitiosum*, even just tolerated. In it lurks the possibility of most original positive knowledge that in some way can only be authentically understood if the interpretation has understood that his first, last and only task is not to be guided, in the previous position, and preview preconception, by naive concepts or guessing. It must, in the elaboration of the previous position, the preview and preconception, to ensure the scientific theme from the things themselves. (HEIDEGGER, 1989[1927], p.201 author's own translation)

It is affirmed in this passage the need for awareness of the concepts that make up the previous understanding of something, so as to avoid obstruction of legitimate meanings by previous reviews: Gadamer (1976/2002), referred to these pre -understandings coupled with a 'historical sense' as preconceptions or 'prejudices' (pre-judgments), inherent of interpretive processes and, therefore, devoid of negative or pejorative connotations. According to the philosopher, any preconception or prejudice can allow or deny the interpretation of something, featuring a complex interpretive process in which each revision of the projection of a prior preconception can launch another projection direction, so that conflicting or competing projections can be positioned side by side in the drawing up of an interpretation that is confirmed in a more clear meaning, and thus, preconceptions are replaced later by more adequate concepts (Gadamer, 1976/2002, p.75). Based on this premise, Gadamer emphasized as Heidegger (1927/1989, p.201) the need to question the adequacy of projections, making sure that it can be confirmed whether or not in the object of interpretation:

Summarily, this constant projecting is what makes the semantic movement to understand and interpret. Who tries to understand is bound to error because of

certain direction. Understanding what is in the text is the development of this prior project who suffer a constant revision while broadens the meaning of the text. "GADAMER (2002 [1976], p.75, author's own translation)

previous opinions, which are not confirmed in the things themselves. Thus, the constant task of understanding is to develop correct projects, adequate to things, i.e., hypotheses that only should be confirmed in 'the things themselves'. (GADAMER 2002 [1976], p.75 author's own translation)

This placement indicates the need to adopt a 'procedure' on interpretation in order to overcome recurring pre-directions by opinions that can disable proper or original senses of the 'thing itself' which is interpreted, i.e., the development of a way to access the validation or adequacy of interpretations (GADAMER 2002[1976]). Given this assessment of the hermeneutic understanding nature, and the need for validation of interpretations, it is assumed that interpreters are able to question their pre-understandings and ask to themselves, in light of the situation and the horizon¹² that it implies, in order to modify their understanding through a dialectical relationship: " [...] Knowledge always means, precisely, considering opposites. Its superiority over preconceived opinion consists in the fact that it is able to conceive of possibilities as possibilities. Knowledge is dialectical from the ground." (GADAMER, 2006[1975] p.359). This is how we approach the comprehension of the importance of dialogue as a means of reflection on knowledge and understanding produced by our socially shared experiences, and in particular the concept of conversation as a dialogic exchange, considering the sense of mutual transformation among its stakeholders.

3. The conversative form in the hermeneutics of understanding

In his 'Truth and Method', Gadamer calls upon dialectics in order to clarify the hermeneutic event nature, distinguishing the dialog as a holder of a 'special primacy' on the search of truth, as the meeting and experience sharing among individuals corresponds to an unfolding of distinct world views, in which is possible to understanding: "[...] the task of hermeneutics is to clarify this miracle of understanding, which is not a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing in a common meaning" (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.292). It is in this 'put ourselves in agreement' toward to a common meaning that Gadamer points the dialogue or its special version, referred as 'conversation', as one of the most notable hermeneutic event forms:

[...] Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself to the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on the subject (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.386).

Here is stated as conversation a genuine dialogue in which individuals are immersed in discussion, both interested to expand their understanding of a certain matter, as well as in

¹² According to Gadamer (2006[1975], p.301): "We define the concept of "situation" by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of "horizon." The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point"

Socratic dialectics,¹³ through a process of changing of opinion by its participants, in which a common agreement about meaning is reached, so that "[...] the objective of all understanding and comprehension is the agreement about something. Hermeneutics ever had the task of address the lack of agreement or restore it when disturbed. (Gadamer, 2002 [1976], p.73 author's own translation). This accordance implies on a 'revelation' of an understanding beyond its initial individual¹⁴, and, thus, the conversation assumes an its own dynamic, with its own directions and developments, so that hinder or even prevent its control or by their conduct by the involved:

We say that we "conduct" a conversation, but the more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own twists and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the partners conversing are far less leaders of it that the led. No one knows in advance what will "come out" of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its won, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it-i.e., that it allows something to "emerge" which henceforth exists (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.385).

This characterization of conversation like a dialectical process fundamentally distinguishes it from the classical rhetoric, where there is an intention of conviction or imposition of ideas by reasoning:

[...] The art of dialectic is not the art of being able to win every argument. On the contrary, it is possible that someone practicing the art of dialectic - i.e., the art of questioning and seeking truth - comes off worse in the argument in the eyes of those listening to it. (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.359).

So, conversation itself depends on the openness to questioning, i.e., on persisting as an inquiry, an experimentation through where it is positioned preliminary projections through question (by the structures of pre-concepts) meanwhile the answer brings openness providing the new: "[...] Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is meaningful passes into one's own thinking on the subject [...]" (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.368). The point is not recognizing something stated as true or false, but simply as something meaningful, so the possibility of truth can be sustained: "[...] this is the real and fundamental nature of a question: namely to make things indeterminate. Questions always bring out the undetermined possibilities of a thing [...]" (Gadamer, 2006 [1975], p.367).

¹³ According to Gadamer (2006 [1975], p.542): "*The maieutic productivity of the Socratic dialogue, the art of using words as a midwife, is certainly directed toward the people who are the partners in the dialogue, but it is concerned merely with the opinions they express, the immanent logic of the subject matter that is unfolded in the dialogue. What emerges in its truth is the logos, which is neither mine nor yours and hence so far transcends the interlocutors' subjective opinions that even the person leading the conversation knows that he does not know. As the art of conducting a conversation, dialectic is also the art of seeing things in the unity of an aspect (sunoran eis hen eidos)—i.e., it is the art of forming concepts through working out the common meaning.*"

¹⁴ According to Snodgrass and Coyne (2006 [1997], p.44): "[...] The conditions are conducive when the interpreter is given over to the dialogue, as happens when we are engrossed in a stimulating conversation. In this situation, I do not choose my words with care; I do not plan what I am about to say, but speak spontaneously. I hear my own words as I utter them and at the same time as my listener hears them, and they can be as disclosive to me as they are to the other."

Gadamer observed that this characteristic of indeterminacy in questioning allow the reveal of new meanings of something through the dialectic structure of true conversations:

[...] there is a profound recognition of the priority of the question in all knowledge and discourse that really reveals something of an object. Discourse that is intended to reveal something requires that that thing be broken open by the question. For this reason, dialectic proceeds by way of question and answer or, rather, the path of all knowledge leads through the question. To ask a question means to bring into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled. The significance of questioning consists in revealing the questionability of what is questioned. It has to be brought into this state of indeterminacy, so that there is an equilibrium between pro and contra. The sense of every question is realized in passing through this state of indeterminacy, in which it becomes an open question. (GADAMER, 2006 [1975], p.357).

It should also be noted that the dialectic of the processes of understanding is presented as an experimentation by the structure of questioning, but in a different way of scientific methodology: [...] "In method the inquirer controls and manipulates; in dialectic the subject matter of the discussion poses questions to which the inquirer responds. The subject matter interrogates the inquirer. The dialectical process is entered into so that the subject matter can reveal itself." (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 1997/2006, p.42). Thus, experience has not its dialectical realization in knowing by itself, but in the openness to experience, which is a 'free play' with experience (SNODGRASS; COYNE, 2006 [1997], p.42). Gadamer claimed the primacy of dialectical inquiry upon the scientific method on the quest of truth placing science in the hermeneutic context of the human condition:

Throughout our investigation it has emerged that the certainty achieved by using scientific methods does not suffice to guarantee truth. This especially applies to the human sciences, but it does not mean that they are less scientific; on the contrary, it justifies the claim to special humane significance that they have always made. The fact that in such knowledge the knower's own being comes into play certainly shows the limits of method, but not of science. Rather, what the tool of method does not achieve must—and really can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and inquiring, a discipline that guarantees truth. (GADAMER, 2006 [1975], p.484).

It is important to remember that this statement is based on the concept that the hermeneutic event of interpretation and understanding is inherent of Being and therefore forms the basis for all rationality and scientific development (SNODGRASS; COYNE 2006 [1996], p.44). Thus, it can not be taken as a methodology, for it is present in every application of methodologies, even though his thematization commonly leads to questions about objectivity and subjectivity, reason and intuition, according to a structure of thought that refers to cartesian rationality. In the last part of this reflection, we expand the horizon of review outlining a more general implications of ontological and epistemological orders to address the context of experience and experimentation through participation in sociocultural activities.

4. Concluding remarks

In these final considerations it's necessary to evidence that the modern hermeneutic thought represents a rupture with ontology and epistemology of rational Cartesian tradition (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995). In a broader sense, hermeneutics can be understood as the continuation of a emerging post-rationalist philosophical movement that distances itself from the regime of questions consistent with the Cartesian rationality, as the conceptual dichotomies of subjective-objective, mind-body, etc., in favor of the relational dimension of things and interdependence between Being and knowledge of the things that make up the whole considered the reality:

A post-rationalist ontology is a return to the primacy of experience. The phenomenology of Husserl advocates a return to the way things appear. Heidegger modifies and develops this theme, beginning with an appeal to the primacy (primordial) experience of unreflective involvement in a world in which there is no subject or object. With Heidegger, even the concept of being 'in' (as in 'in the world') is transient, derived, contextual and even cultural. Other understandings of being, such as that in which we distinguish a subject separated from an 'objective world', are built upon this experience (Snodgrass and Coyne, 1995, p.45).

According to Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores (1990, p.30), Heidegger's thought is fundamentally opposed to western philosophical tradition mind-body dualism, expressed in the assumption of the existence of two distinct phenomenological domains, a real and objective physical world and a mental subjective world composite of thoughts and feelings of the individual. The authors point out that Heidegger rejected the concept of an independence between objective and subjective instances asserting the impossibility of one without the other, and exalted the importance of interpretation: "[...] existence is interpretation and interpretation is existence. Prejudice is not a condition in which the subject is led to interpret the world falsely, but is the necessary condition of having a background for interpretation (hence Being)" (Winograd and Flores, 1990, pp.31-32). Therefore, our interpretations, adequate or not, are based on other interpretations, based on more interpretations by an unceasing regression and then "[...] this lack of final and absolute certainty is the inescapable epistemological predicament that is built into the human condition. It is a condition of our own finitude" (Snodgrass and Coyne, 2006 [1997], p.40). This approach to understanding as a process of accommodation of meaning in a historical sense, is fundamentally opposed to the subject-object dichotomy assumed in cartesian thinking underlying the validation of hypotheses by logical-rational structures, such as those traditionally used in scientific thinking. Claiming the non-primordality of separation between subject and object implies challenging the cartesian epistemological tradition of independence of reason and the possibility of reaching truth through the free thought of pre-judgments and objective knowledge (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995, p.44). As seen, this is the context of Gadamer's hermeneutical thought (1997 [1975], 2002 [1976]):

The Cartesian view of objective knowledge is abandoned by writers such as Gadamer. In appealing to the common experience of how understanding arises, Gadamer establishes the impossibility of an 'unprejudiced mind', thereby disabling Enlightenment thought and its 'prejudice against prejudice'. Knowledge does not proceed as of logical propositions derived through long chains of reasoning, nor does it depend on foundational propositions. Gadamer explains understanding with the hermeneutical circle metaphor, which implicates the subject and the object in a game of interpretation (hermeneutics) that does not favor one over the other and in fact, 'fuses' subject and object (Snodgrass and Coyne, 1995, p.46).

As Coyne and Snodgrass (1995, p.46) observed, a post-rationalist epistemology shows skepticism about schemes of knowledge legitimation, recognizing the inconsistency of understanding and that logical paradoxes provide evidence of fragility in the relationship between logic and reasoning, and that a narrow view on rationalism principles can cause some disorientation: "[...] No longer can we behave as if knowledge grows in increments. Knowledge changes. Understanding comes about through dialogue" (Coyne and Snodgrass, 1995, p.46). Winograd e Flores (1990, pp.74-75), complement this view claiming that "[...] knowledge is always the result of interpretation, which depends on the entire previous experience of the interpreter and on situatedness in a tradition. It is neither 'subjective' (particular to the individual) nor 'objective' (independent of the individual)". It is highlighted in this epistemological reading the social and relational dimensions of the phenomenon of understanding:

The key to much of what we have been saying [...] lies in recognizing the fundamental importance of the shift from an individual-centered conception of understanding to one that is socially based. Knowledge and understanding (in both the cognitive and linguistic senses) no not result from formal operations on mental representations of an objectively existing world. Rather, they arise from the individual's committed participation in mutually oriented patterns of behavior that are embedded in a socially shared background of concerns, actions, and beliefs (Winograd and Flores, 1990, p.78).

Based on these theoretical premises, it is possible to perform some considerations in terms of promoting socio-cultural actions by groups of academic research, as the case of the Nomads.Usp Hybrid Territories Project. At the various phases (planning, implementation, evaluation, etc.) related to the implementation of such initiatives as research experiences, Some attention should be given to how the participants understanding (and their structures of prejudice, intentions and expectations) are crucial in the design of the shared actions, that should be considered as processes of 'project' (in the sense of 'projection' presented earlier, and finds a match in the activity of architectural production) than effectively by the way of traditional scientific experiment. In this process, researchers, partners and the general public, ie. all those involved directly or indirectly to the actions have the possibility to actually participate in their designing, and since dialogical exchanges actually occurs, it gives rise to a potentially different, new and proper design result. However, the imposition of preconceptions, expectations and intentions of certain private decision-makers over others, ignoring or violating the agreements and/or the required dialogues tend to generate more predictable

results, rigid forms with little meaning or coherence, generally inadequate or inappropriate to their context¹⁵. In this sense, measures for the realization of a truly dialogic experimentation process could include the clarification and transparency on record and systematization of agreements and responsibilities between researchers and partners, and monitoring the extent to which these agreements are carried forward and actualizes as actions, and if they are not, to investigate which causes or determinants, and its implications for the development of the whole action itself. As stated by Gadamer (2002 [1976], p.247) dialogue carries the possibility of recognition of similarities and distinctions between individuals and the self-knowledge by meeting the other, and therefore it is not strictly follow pre-designed planning purposes or imposition of will by rhetorical speech, but an openness for participation in common sense, the revelation of shared understandings which allows for change and transformation, to put yourself in relation, the integration and expansion of horizons¹⁶. Thus, willing to dialogue we can find more coherence than one might initially assume.

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¹⁵ In the particular understanding of the present author, this is the case of socio-cultural practices supported by overriding interest (whether in hierarchies of power or control, such as the public, and/or private government) that can be read as merely aestheticizing images or even objects of consumption.

¹⁶ Regarding to the 14th. footnote.